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Endogenous Uncertainty is that component of economic risk and market volatility which is propagated within
the economy by the beliefs and actions of agents.  The theory of Rational Belief (see Kurz [1994]) permits
rational agents to hold diverse beliefs and consequently, a Rational Belief Equilibrium (in short, RBE) may
exhibit diverse patterns of Endogenous Uncertainty.  This paper shows that most of the observed volatility in
financial markets is generated by the beliefs of the agents and the diverse market puzzles which are
examined in this paper, such as the equity premium puzzle, are all driven by the structure of market
expectations.  To make the case for this theory we present a single RBE model, which builds on
developments in Kurz and Beltratti [1997] and Kurz and Schneider [1996], with which we study a list of
phenomena that have been viewed as "anomalies" in financial markets. The model is able to predict the
correct order of magnitude of:  
(i)   the long term mean and standard deviation of the price\dividend ratio;
(ii)  the long term mean and standard deviation of the risky rate of return on equities;
(iii) the long term mean and standard deviation of the riskless rate;
(iv) the long term mean equity premium.
In addition, the model predicts 
(v) the GARCH property of risky asset returns;
(vi) the Forward Discount Bias in foreign exchange markets.
We also conjecture that an adaptation of the same model to markets with derivative assets will predict the
appearance of "smile curves" in derivative prices.
The common economic explanation for these phenomena is the existence of heterogenous agents with
diverse but correlated beliefs.  Given such diversity, some agents are optimistic and some pessimistic.  We
develop a simple model which allows agents to be in these two states of belief but the identity of the optimists
and the pessimists fluctuates over time since at any date any agent may be in these two states of belief.  In
this model there is a unique parameterization under which the model makes all the above predictions
simultaneously.  That is, although the parameter space of the RBE is large, all parameterizations outside a
small neighborhood of the parameter space fail significantly to reproduce some subset of variables under
consideration.  Any parameter choice in this small neighborhood requires the optimists to be in the majority
but the rationality of belief conditions of the RBE require the pessimists to have a higher intensity level.  This
higher intensity  has a decisive effect on the market: it increases the demand for riskless assets, decreases the
equilibrium riskless rate and increases the equity premium.  In simple terms, the large equity premium and the
lower equilibrium riskless rate are the result of the fact that at any moment of time there are agents who hold
extreme pessimistic beliefs and they have a relatively stronger impact on the market.  The relative impact of
these two groups of agents who are, at any moment of time, in the two states of belief is a direct consequence
of the rationality of belief conditions and in that sense it is unique to an RBE. 
  As for the correlation among the beliefs of agents, the paper shows that the dynamics of asset prices
are strongly affected by such correlation.  The pattern of correlation which was used in the model can be
explained intuitively in terms of its effect on the dynamics of prices. The model correlation causes periods of
price rises (i.e. bull markets) to develop slower than periods of decline (i.e. bear markets) hence the model
dynamics do not permit prices to shoot directly from the bottom to the top but the opposite is possible and
takes the form of market crashes.
Note: Both the RBE model developed in this paper as well as the associated programs used to solve it are
available to the public on Professor Kurz’s web page at   http://www.stanford.edu/~mordecai/
JEL Classification Numbers: D5, D84, G12.
Key Words: Rational Expectations, Rational Beliefs, Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE),
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  Endogenous Uncertainty and Market Volatility
1
by
Mordecai Kurz and Maurizio Motolese
Stanford University
The theory of Rational Belief Equilibrium (in short, RBE; see Kurz [1994], [1997]) was
developed with the view of studying the effects of  beliefs and expectations of economic agents on
the volatility of economic variables and on social risk.  Application of the theory to various
markets were reported by Kurz and Beltratti [1997], by Kurz and Schneider [1996] and by Kurz
[1997a],[1998].  These papers advanced the idea that the "equity premium puzzle" (due to Mehra
and Prescott [1985]) can be resolved by the theory of rational beliefs.  This is in contrast with
recent attempts to resolve the equity premium puzzle by the use of a "habit forming" utility
function (see Abel [1999], Campbell and Cochrane [1995] and Constantinides [1990]).  Other
approaches to the equity premium puzzle were reported by Brennan and Xia [1998], Epstein and
Zin [1990], Cecchetti, Lam and Mark [1990],[1993], Heaton and Lucas [1986], Mankiw [1986],
Reitz [1988], Weil [1989] and many others.  Most of the work on the equity premium
concentrated on the analysis of the premium, the riskless rate, the risky rate and their second
moments.  We note that apart from the price volatility controversy generated by Shiller [1981],
the "calibration" literature has mostly ignored the comparison between the model’s volatility of
stock prices and the historical record; such a comparison is one more test of the model’s ability to
explain the data.  Also, financial markets exhibit other dynamical patterns for which standard2
models have failed to give a satisfactory explanation. Examples include the GARCH phenomenon
in asset returns, the "Forward Discount Bias" in foreign exchange markets and the various "smile
curves" in derivative markets.  Hence the validity of any equilibrium theory should not be judged
only by its ability to match the five statistics mentioned above, but also by the range of other
anomalies that the theory is capable of explaining.
This paper is broader in scope than previous papers on RBE and its purpose is to make the
case that most of the observed volatility in financial markets is expectationally generated and
many "anomalies" observed in these markets such as the equity premium puzzle, the GARCH
pattern of asset returns, the Forward Discount Bias in foreign exchange markets, are all driven by
the structure of  heterogenous beliefs in the market.  In support of this view we present a unified
model of market volatility which is relatively simple and demonstrate that the RBE of the model is
able to explain a wide range of these anomalies.  First, it predicts the correct order of magnitude
of (i) the equity premium, (ii) the first and second moments of the price\dividend ratio, (iii) the
first and second moments the risky return, and (iv) the first and second moments of the riskless
rate.  Second, the time series of stock returns exhibit a GARCH phenomenon, and third, an
extension of the model to a two countries model exhibits a "forward discount bias" in its foreign
exchange market.  Our model extends ideas in Kurz and Beltratti [1997], Kurz and Schneider
[1996] and Kurz [1997a] in a manner to be explained.  We are able to give both a simple
economic interpretation to the empirical record as well as provide a unified theory for the
dynamics of financial markets.
Before turning to the description of our OLG model in Section 2, we provide a
justification for our modeling strategy which is based on heterogenous beliefs.  This explanation3
will be linked to the methodology with which we propose, in Section 3, to test the validity of any
model with heterogenous beliefs.  Section 4 will close the paper.
1.   Why a Paradigm of Heterogenous Beliefs?
The theory of Rational Beliefs and RBE starts from the empirical observation that
intelligent economic agents hold diverse beliefs even when there is no difference in the
information at their disposal.  Indeed, the center of their disagreement is often the diverse
interpretations of the available information.  By adopting axioms which allow rational agents to
hold diverse beliefs, our theory does not lead, in general, to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(in short, REE).  However, an REE is also an RBE since the theory of RBE is an extension of the
theory of REE.  These observations suggest that it would be constructive to explain first why the
REE model is an unsatisfactory special case and why the paradigm of diverse beliefs offers a
satisfactory alternative in situations when economic volatility is a dominant phenomenon.
1a.  Is Rational Expectations a Reasonable Assumption?  
The assumption of rational expectations takes various forms.  In the Arrow-Radner
equilibrium theory with securities agents are required to know the map between future equilibrium
prices and exogenous states.  However, in Radner [1979] where agents have asymmetric
information, the ability to invert the equilibrium map requires agents to know each other’s
probability beliefs of the exogenous states.  To satisfy this condition one may as well assume that
all agents hold the same belief and that all agents know this fact. In most dynamic models in
economics and finance, rational expectations takes the more familiar requirement that agents4
know the true equilibrium probability distribution of all variables.  Most economists agree that
both conditions impose unreasonable requirements on what an agent must know in order to be
viewed as "rational".  Kurz [1994] refers to both forms of knowledge as "structural knowledge"
to be distinguished from "empirical knowledge" or "information" about the state of the world. 
Probability distributions and equilibrium maps are not observable but one may speculate
that learning could provide some foundation for the assumption of rational expectations.  This
view proposes that heterogeneity may vanish as data becomes available since added data could
enable agents to  learn the true structure of the economy.  Most of the work along this line
adopted the Bayesian perspective which was inspired by martingale convergence theorems.  A
corresponding heated debate took place in the statistical literature under the heading of "Bayes
Consistency" ( see Diaconis and Freedman [1986]).  The essential conclusion of the debate is that
the convergence of the posterior to the true distribution is a rare occurrence.  In two influential
papers, Freedman [1963], [1965] shows that even when the statistician has a controlled
experiment so that the data is generated  i.i.d., if the true distribution is complex, the convergence
of the posterior is a rare event.  The problem is further compounded in typical learning situations
in markets and games where the data is generated by an unknown process and the convergence of
the posterior is even less likely (see Feldman [1991]).
If learning cannot provide a foundation for rational expectations, it does not make sense to
regard as "irrational" an agent who does not know what he cannot know.  Hence,  a more general
model than an REE would be desirable simply on the elementary ground that an REE is based on
unrealistic assumptions.  In addition, those who are opposed to REE often note the ample
empirical evidence for the presence of diverse opinions in the market.  Hence, it is important to5
explore how the REE literature explains this diversity of beliefs observed in the market.
1b.   Diversity of Information or Diversity of Beliefs? 
Starting with financial markets, the most common explanation given in the REE literature
for the observed persistent heterogeneity of beliefs is the diversity of private information.  It is
argued that agents do not possess different prior beliefs but, rather, that they have different
private information resulting in different conditional beliefs. The theoretical and applied literature
adopting this approach is extensive (for example see Kyle [1985], Wang [1993] [1994] and
references there).  This explanation is unsatisfactory from both theoretical as well as empirical
perspectives.  Theoretical considerations lead to the information revelation of rational
expectations (e.g. Grossman [1981], Radner [1979]) which implies that prices make public all
private information and therefore the introduction of asymmetric information, by itself, is not
sufficient.  It simply transforms the problem into other paradoxes.  These include the problem of
explaining why agents trade at all (e.g. Milgrom and Stokey [1982]); why asset prices fluctuate
more than could be explained by "fundamentals" (e.g.  Shiller [1981]), indirectly generating an
equity premium puzzle (see Mehra and Prescott [1985]); and why any resources are ever used for
the production of information (see Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]). To explain the observed
heterogeneity and avoid such paradoxes researchers had, therefore, to introduce some additional
assumptions of market structure that would remove the information revelation property of
rational expectations.  Consider, for example, the explicit introduction of uninformed noise traders
or general "noise" which leads to a theory of "noisy rational expectations equilibrium."  This is a
negation of rational expectations since  the assumption of noise in prices explicitly introduces6
irrationality of uninformed traders into the theory.  The artificial, and unsatisfactory, assumption
of irrationality is then the one driving all the important conclusions.
We turn now to the empirical considerations making the assumption of asymmetric
information in financial markets unsatisfactory.  We note first the ample empirical evidence for the
opposite view that equally informed agents interpret differently the same  information (see, for
example, Frankel and Froot [1990], Frankel and Rose [1995] and Kandel and Pearson [1995]). 
This implies that the agents have different probability beliefs which they condition on the same
public information.  However, focusing on asymmetric information, is there any empirical
evidence to support the assumption of  widespread use of private information in financial
markets?  We think that the evidence is not there.  Moreover, since it is illegal to trade on inside
private information, are we to conclude that the high volatility of financial markets is a result of
widespread and persistent criminal behavior by traders?  The  majority of firms whose securities
are traded on public exchanges are monitored carefully by a professional community of regulators,
brokers, financial managers etc.  Hence there  is ample evidence that, on the whole, the majority
of firms avoid letting any market participant either obtain private information or trade on it if he
has such information.  Furthermore, since modern financial markets are dominated by large
institutions with vast resources which can be used to process all available information, elementary
competitive behavior should lead us to conclude that all will possess the same information. 
We conclude that, apart from insurance markets where asymmetric information plays a
central role, in most financial markets the assumption of asymmetric information has a dual
problem.  First, on its own, this assumption has little explanatory power due to the revelation
mechanism of REE.  Consequently, asymmetric information must be supplemented by7
unreasonable additional assumptions about "friction", "noise" or other "stories".  Second, it is
difficult to find an empirical justification for the validity of this assumption in securities markets.
Turning to macroeconomics, recall that the critique of the Keynesian theory by the rational
expectations approach was associated with the rejection of the wage and price rigidities implicit in
the Keynesian system.  However, under the classical assumptions of price and wage flexibility and
market clearing in equilibrium, rational expectations implies the usual conclusions of  neo-classical
analysis: in equilibrium the economy operates at full employment, GNP grows at the potential
level, etc. This classical framework cannot explain the observed structure of aggregate
fluctuations and, in particular, the observed cyclical correlation among economic variables such as
the positive correlation between the price level and aggregate output (the "inflation - output
tradeoff").  In order to explain the data, the New Classical Theory introduced complex
assumptions of asymmetric information which became the driving force of the theory.  More
specifically, although agents are assumed to have rational expectations, they have asymmetric
information and are unable to obtain information which is public in other parts of the economy. 
This rigidity in the transmission of public information leads to diverse models of  Phelpsian or
Lucasian  "islands" (see Phelps [1970] and Lucas [1973]).  The important Lucas supply curve
(Lucas [1973]) is deduced from the assumption that firms confuse price level fluctuations for
relative price fluctuations since they are also assumed not to be able to observe the normally
observable aggregate price level. 
The essential point is that in standard macroeconomic REE models, heterogeneity across
agents is caused by assumptions about agents not being able to make rather simple observations
and needing to form expectations about what they do not know.  The validity of the "islands"8
assumptions and the rigid information structure which they impose are hard to accept.  Using a
term proposed by Lucas [1982], the models are "rigged" to generate the heterogeneity which
induces the desired empirical implication.
The arguments presented here highlight the fact that although the rational expectations
assumption insists on a common belief of agents, the empirical implications of the common belief
assumption - by itself -  are rather absurd.  The crucial empirical implications of models
incorporating such assumption are generated by an added set of assumptions.  These may include
asymmetry of information, lack of adequate knowledge, irrational behavior of some agents, etc. 
Most of these added assumptions introduce "stories" with questionable theoretical and empirical
foundations but these questionable assumptions are the ones which drive the results!
This paper, the papers included in Kurz [1997] and others (e.g. Garmaise [1998], Kurz
[1998], Motolese [1998], Nielsen [1997], Wu and Guo [1998]) suggest that in many situations,
particularly in the study of market risk and economic fluctuations, it is more plausible to accept an
alternative paradigm.  This paradigm is based on the hypothesis that agents do not have structural
knowledge and, as a natural consequence, conclude that rational agents may have diverse beliefs
about what they do not know.  The empirical evidence for these two components of our approach
is substantial.  Moreover, the scientific merit of this alternative paradigm is derived mostly from
the fact that it offers new and useful economic insights with which we can answer difficult
economic questions.  Hence, we conclude this Section by presenting brief arguments in support of
this new paradigm.  We use the terminology of "the diversity of beliefs theory" to refer to the
combination of the hypothesis that agents do not have structural knowledge and the related theory
of RBE which demonstrates that rational agents may have diverse beliefs.9
We observe at the outset  that REE assumes that expectations do not matter and, having
done so, insists that other exogenous "fundamental" factors drive the real conclusions of the
model.  In contrast, under the diversity of belief theory "expectations matter" and the distribution
of beliefs can have an important effect on the time series generated by the economy.  On a more
fundamental level, the diversity of beliefs theory rejects the validity of the formulation of
uncertainty as being only an exogenous phenomenon.  It insists that economic uncertainty and
fluctuations have a large endogenous component which is propagated within the economy rather
than being caused by exogenous shocks.  Following Kurz [1974] we call it Endogenous
Uncertainty. This uncertainty, which is probably the dominant form of uncertainty in our society,
is indirectly the uncertainty about the beliefs and actions of other agents.  Price uncertainty is,
perhaps, the central form of Endogenous Uncertainty in a sequential economy.  
Keep in mind that the common belief assumption is a special case of a model with diverse
beliefs.  Also, the assumption of asymmetric information is entirely compatible with diverse prior
beliefs.  Hence the diversity of beliefs theory is a more general paradigm than the model of
common belief.  Yet, the idea of diverse beliefs has been controversial.  It would thus be
constructive to review some arguments against models with diverse beliefs and, by implication,
make the case in favor of such a paradigm.
Those who object to the introduction of any diversity of beliefs insist that it reduces the
predictive value of equilibrium analysis since it enlarges the set of individual actions which are
viewed as optimal.  We reject this criticism on the ground that it is based on a misunderstanding
of the function of the diversity of beliefs theory.  We have stressed that an important purpose of
introducing models with diverse beliefs is to replace the artificial "rigging" of REE based models The last point is central to our perspective and at the risk of repetition we sharpen its statement.  
2
We have shown that without the "extra" assumptions, rational expectations based models cannot explain a
large array of observed phenomena.   Hence, if any theory under consideration is to have explanatory power,
one must make a choice in which direction to proceed.  One direction in which contemporary analysis has
gone is to introduce "fundamental" assumptions such as private information, rigidity in the transfer of public
information, noise trading, etc.  What we propose is that the diversity of beliefs paradigm is an alternative
new direction that one may take.  The papers in Kurz [1997] demonstrate that there is an extensive range of
problems which can be studied with the tools of this paradigm, leading to new insights with implications for
positive analysis and for collective actions.
10
when the added assumptions are of questionable validity.  The diversity of  beliefs does, indeed,
enlarge the set market outcomes which are viewed as rational as an alternative to the way in
which the assumptions of asymmetric information and noise trading add outcomes that would
have otherwise been impossible in an REE .
2
Returning to the enlarged set market outcomes which may be explained with diverse
beliefs, we claim that the enlarged set is the main virtue of our new approach!  The two
paradigms offer profoundly different explanations for the observed facts. The REE perspective
proposes that the sources of all risk and economic fluctuations are exogenous to the economy. 
This is also true of REE with sunspots where the sunspot process is exogenous to the economy
and in no sense is endogenously selected by the agents. The problem is that in most studies the
level of volatility of the exogenous shocks is insufficient to explain the observed market volatility.
The diversity of beliefs paradigm points to endogenous uncertainty as the additional component
of social risk that has been missed in these studies.  In general equilibrium terms, it insists that the
state space be endogenously expanded to include the "state of beliefs" so that variations in this
component of the state space have a real impact on economic allocations.  Since endogenous
uncertainty entails added fluctuations on a microeconomic level,  the presence of such uncertainty
necessitates a larger set of individual actions.  Hence the enlarged set of outcomes is exactly why11
endogenous uncertainty is a useful theory!
Finally, our rejection of the criticism is also methodological.  Recall the comments
regarding the availability of empirical evidence that equally informed agents disagree. Hence, it is
a sound scientific procedure to explore the implications of a competing theory which explains the
empirical evidence.   Indeed, any such theory should have the REE model of common belief with
full structural knowledge as a special case and comparisons with this reference case should be
important in determining which approach provides a deeper insight.  Ultimately, it is scientific
usefulness which should be the basis for a choice between the two approaches.
We have cited recent work to show that the diverse beliefs paradigm has been a
productive scientific tool.  This paper adds an important dimension to support the diverse beliefs
paradigm: a unified theory of market volatility.  It demonstrates that a long array of "anomalies"
in financial markets are all driven by expectations and consequently can all be explained by a
single theory in which the diverse beliefs paradigm is the central component. 
2.  The RBE of an OLG Stock Market Economy
Our stock market economy is a relatively standard two-agent, OLG, economy with a
single, homogenous, consumption good.  Each agent lives two periods, the first when he is
"young" and the second when he is "old."  Each young agent is a replica of the old agent who
preceded him, where the term "replica" refers to utilities and beliefs, and hence this is a model of
two infinitely lived "dynasties" denoted by k = 1, 2.  One can think of  k  as the identity of the pair
of young and old agents of the dynasty at date t.  We often use the term "agent k" but the context







receive an endowment  6 ,  t = 1, 2, .... of the single consumption good.  We view  6   as the t t
k k
labor income of agent  k  at date  t  and the stochastic processes {6 , t = 1, 2, ...}  for  k = 1, 2  t
k
will be specified below.  Additional net output is supplied by a firm which produces exogenously,
as in Lucas [1978], the strictly positive profit process {D , t = 1, 2, ...} with no input.  These net t
outputs are paid out to the shareholders of the firm as dividends at the date at which the output is
produced. The ownership shares are traded on a stock market and their aggregate supply is  1. 
The stock market economy has three markets: (i) a market for the consumption good with
an aggregate supply equaling the total endowment plus total dividends, (ii) a stock market with
total supply of 1, and (iii) a market for a zero net supply, short term riskless debt instrument
which we call a "bill".   Since the stochastic growth rate of dividends is Markovian with two
states, the economy has a complete financial structure in the sense that the number of financial
instruments equals the number of states.  To ensure intergenerational efficiency, the financial
sector is initiated at date 1  by distributing the unit supply of shares among the old of that date. 
The above assumptions are the same as in Kurz and Beltratti [1997] and Kurz and
Schneider [1996].  However, Kurz and Schneider [1996] did not assume that the economy grows
and did not calibrate their results to any empirically known facts.  Kurz and Beltratti [1997]
allowed growth into the model and in that sense our model is the same as theirs.  The main
difference is in the parametrization of the model and in the economic interpretation of the results. 
The notation which we employ is as follows:  for k = 1, 2
 - consumption of  k when young  at  t;  
- consumption of  k when old at t + 1 (implying that the agent was born at t);
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 - the random growth rate of dividends;
￿   - amount of stock purchases by young agent  k  at  t; t
k
B  - amount of one period bill purchased by young agent  k  at  t; t
k
6  - endowment of  young agent  k  at  t; t
k
P -  the price of the common stock at t; t
- the price/dividend ratio of the common stock at  t;
- the price of a one period bill at t.  This is a discount price;
I - history of all observables up to t; t
2.1   The Equilibrium Concept.
We normalize prices by using consumption as a numeraire.  Given this, the optimization
problem of agent  k  has the following structure at all  t = 1, 2, ...: 
(1a)
subject to
(1b)         
(1c)   
Q  is a probability belief of agent k on all future variables which he does not know. To
k
enable us to compute equilibria we take the utility function agent  k  to be 
(2)
With this specification the Euler equations for agent  k  are
(3a)
(3b)  Dt ￿ 1 ￿ Dtdt ￿ 1
1,1￿ 1






























The parameters of the model are selected to equal the values of the corresponding
estimates for the real economy.  We thus aim to calibrate the model and test its ability to generate
solutions which are of the same order of magnitudes as the observed endogenous variables.
(2.1a) The dividend process and the equilibrium map.  The simulation model is Markovian
where the exogenous process of dividends is as specified in Kurz-Beltratti [1997] who follow the 
estimates of Mehra and Prescott [1985].  It takes the following form
(4) .
where {d , t = 1, 2, ...} is a stationary and ergodic Markov process.  The state space of the t
process is  J  = {d  , d }  with   d  = 1.054  and  d  = .982  and a transition matrix D
HL H L
(5)
with 1 = .43.  Hence, over time agents experience a secular rise of dividends and it is therefore 
convenient to focus on growth rates.  To do that let 
 
  is the endowment/dividend ratio of agent  k  at date  t;
 
   is the bill/dividend ratio of agent  k  at date  t;
    is the ratio of consumption when young to aggregate capital income;
 is the ratio of consumption when old to aggregate capital income;
We  assume that  7  = 7    for k = 1, 2  are constant.  This implies that if we define ￿ =  t
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because production and labor markets are not the focus of this paper and in part because of
computational feasibility.  We now divide the budget constraints (1b) by D  and (1c) by D , tt + 1
equation (3a) by    and equation (3b) by    to obtain, for  k = 1, 2
(6a)  ,   
               
(6b) ,
      
(6c) ,  
(6d) .
(6a) - (6b)  imply demand functions which take the general time dependent form, for k = 1, 2
(7a)
   
(7b)
   
Equilibrium requires the market clearing conditions 
(7c)
(7d)  ;
The equilibrium in (7a)-(7d) depends upon the beliefs of the agents and upon what they
condition on.  In this paper we restrict our attention to stable Markov equilibria.
Definition 1: Beliefs (Q ,Q ) and a stochastic process { , t = 1, 2,...} 
12
with initial portfolios   ,  and with true probability  $ constitute a 
stable Markov competitive equilibrium if 
(i)    satisfy conditions (7a) - (7d) at all dates t; 
(ii)    and   are independent of the history  I .  t -1mn(B)(x)
lim
n ￿￿








t ￿ bk(pt ,q t ,d t)
￿
k
t ￿ ￿k(pt ,q t ,d t)
 Let {x , t = 1, 2, ...} be a stochastic process under the probability $.  For any event B denote by
3
t
 the relative frequency out of  n  draws at which the process visits B.  Note that the event  B may be
complex and multidimensional.  Then,
Definition: A stochastic process is called stable (or statistically stable) if for any finite dimensional set (i.e.
cylinder)  B
A non-stationary process may be unstable just due to the fact that it grows without bound.  In that case the
definition would be applied to some transformation of the process.
16
(iii)  (Q , Q  , $)  are stable measures in the sense of Kurz [1994] . 
12 3
It follows from (7a)-(7d) that the price process { , t = 1, 2, ...} of a stable Markov
equilibrium is defined by an equilibrium sequence of maps 
(7e)    
where the time dependence of the equilibrium map represents the potential time dependence of the
beliefs of agents.  In an REE, Q  = Q  = $  where $  is the true probability induced by (5) and by
12
the stationary equilibrium map (7e).  In an REE the states of beliefs of agents have no effect on
prices and all demand functions are time independent.  We review this case first. 
(2.1b) Rational expectations equilibria.  In a Markov REE  Q  = Q  = $  and, deduced from (5),
12
the probabilities of   in (6c) - (6d) are conditioned only on the realized value of 
d   It then follows that the demand functions must take the form t . 
(8a)
(8b) .





In the special case postulated in (5) the growth rate of dividends takes two values.  In this case
Equation (9a) shows that a stable Markov equilibrium is, in fact, a stationary equilibrium with two
prices and two optimal portfolios.
 2.2     The Structure of Beliefs and Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE)
Our development here uses assumptions and concepts from the theory of Rational Beliefs
(see Kurz [1994] [1997]) and the tools of "assessment variables" used to construct Markov RBE
as developed in Kurz and Schneider [1996] and Nielsen [1996].  For completeness of exposition
we briefly explain below how these tools are used here.  
The theory of Rational Beliefs assumes that agents do not have "structural knowledge":
they do not know market excess demand functions or equilibrium maps and hence cannot
compute equilibria or invert equilibrium maps.  In addition, they do not know the true equilibrium
probability of any observed variable in the economy.  The theory assumes that agents have
costless access to all past economic data and hence know all that can be deduced from  the
empirical distribution of the observed variables.  Rational Beliefs are then probability beliefs on
sequences of observed equilibrium variables which are compatible with the known empirical
distribution of the equilibrium process.  The probability defined by the empirical distribution is
called  "the stationary measure" induced by the equilibrium dynamics.  The sense in which the
term "compatible" is used here requires us to think of a rational belief  Q   as if it was the true
k
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probability of the equilibrium process by  $.  Under the hypothetical probability  Q , the
k
equilibrium process will generate an empirical distribution which may be different from the known
empirical distribution generated under  $.  A belief  Q   is a Rational Belief if the empirical
k
distribution under  Q   is the same as the one generated under the true equilibrium probability  $.
k
The main theorem in Kurz [1994] shows that if agent k adopts a belief  Q   which is
k
different from the stationary measure, he must believe that the economic environment is non-
stationarity.  However, a non-stationary probability of a Markov process with finite number of
states is represented by a time varying sequence of Markov matrixes  .  This is
interpreted to say that at date t  the process is defined by the transition matrix   .  If the set of
possible Markov matrices is {G , G  , ..., G } one can represent the non-stationary probability 12 M
with a time function   taking values in {1, 2, ... , M}.  This is then used to represent the
sequence of transition matrices as {  }.
The above problem, of selecting a sequence of matrices to describe a non-stationary
probability measure, is exactly the same problem of describing Rational Beliefs  Q   for k = 1, 2 
k
as needed in (6c)-(6d) and (7e).  It turns out that the complicating factor is the determination of
the rationality of belief conditions which the sequence of matrices must satisfy.  The method of
"assessment variables" is our tool to describe the non stationarity of such rational beliefs.
(2.2a) Assessment Variables and the State Space. Assessment variables are sequences of random
variables {y  , t = 1, 2, ...} for  k = 1, 2  generated by the agents.  In this paper y  ￿Y = {0, 1}.  A t t
k k
belief  Q    is then a probability on the joint process {(p ,q , d , y ),  t = 1, 2, ...} which is
k k
tt t t
assumed to be Markov.  Hence, under Q  and Q ,  the assessment variables are jointly distributed
12(pt￿1,qt￿1,dt￿1,y
k
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with the real market variables and hence their distribution may depend upon other economic
variables.  Also, they may be correlated with future economic variables and hence conditioning on
them alters the  predictions of future economic variables.
From an economic perspective, assessment variables are parameters indicating how an
agent interprets current information and heeee are tools for the description of stable and non-
stationary processes (see Kurz and Schneider [1996] pages 491-495 on this point).  These
variables have purely subjective meaning and should not be taken to be objective and transferable
"information".   Their impact on the real economy arises from the fact that conditioning on them
by the agents alters their probability beliefs about future values of economic variables.  We
explain this now.
(i) Assessment variables and the equilibrium map.  In (6c) - (6d) agent  k  uses the probability of 
 conditional on  .   It follows from our Markov assumptions
that the demands of agent  k  for stocks and bills are time-independent functions of  the form
(10a)
(10b) .
Consequently we can write the market clearing conditions as
(10c)
(10d)   
The system (10c)-(10d) implies that the equilibrium map of this economy takes the form
(11) .



































 The choice of the equilibrium dynamics being generated by a fixed, stationary, matrix is a matter of
4
convenience and simplicity in this paper.  In general the process { , t = 1, 2, ...} could have been
selected to be any stable process with a Markov stationary measure induced by the empirical distribution.  In
such a case the fixed transition matrix  ￿  would characterize only the stationary measure of the equilibrium
dynamics rather than be the matrix of the true probability of the equilibrium dynamics of prices.
20
the "state of belief" represented by the vector  .
To clarify the role of the assessment variables in (11) note that in (10a) - (10b) we
specified that the demand functions are not time dependent and hence the assessment variables
completely determine the conditional probabilities of the agents.  From the assumption of a
Markov equilibrium it must be that  y   determines completely the transition matrix from  t
k
to   which is used by agent k at date t.  Moreover, y ￿ { 0 , 1}  implies that the agent t
k 
has at most two Markov matrices and at each date the value taken by his assessment variable
determines which of these two the agent uses.  We shall later define the beliefs in such a manner
that "1" is a state of optimism while  "0" is a state of pessimism.
The equilibrium map implies that there are at most  8  distinct price vectors   that
may ever be observed and these correspond to the  8  combinations of   .  Moreover,
due to our Markov assumption, the true equilibrium transition probability from the 8 prices
  to the  8  prices  is determined entirely by the transition probability from
 to   .   In all applications below we select the joint process
{ , t = 1, 2, ...} to be a stationary Markov process with a transition matrix   ￿.  This
implies  that the true equilibrium process of prices has a fixed transition probability from 
4
to   defined by  ￿.  The agents, who compute the empirical distribution, will discover 
￿  and this matrix will be used to construct the stationary measure.  However, the agents do not
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relative to  ￿.  Indeed, the fact that they form rational beliefs in accord with their assessment
variables is what rationalizes  ￿  to be the equilibrium probability of the implied RBE.
(ii) Assessment variables and the state space.  The state space for prices is  (J ×Y×Y)  but one D
￿
may also consider the state space to be  S   where  S is the index space S = {1, 2, ..., 8}.  We can
￿
then define a new equilibrium map 0 between the indices of prices and the states of dividends and
assessment variables (indexed by a number from 1 to 8 rather than by t ) by
(12) .
d   is the "high dividends" and  d  is the "low dividends" states. (11)-(12) highlight the idea of 
HL
Endogenous Uncertainty which identifies the variability of prices at each state of the exogenous
variables.  It shows that the volatility of prices depends upon the states of belief of the agents.
(iii) The exogenous variables.  A belief Q   was defined as a probability on the space of sequences
k
{( p ,q , d , y  ),  t = 1, 2, ...}.   We have also shown that the belief of an agent was reduced to tt t t
k
selecting transition matrices from    to   .  This appears to ignore the probability
of the exogenous variable  d .   To see that this distribution is not ignored consider the map  0  in t 
(12).  It shows that the probability of d   equals the probability of prices from 1 to 4 and the
H
probability of  d   equals the probability of prices from 5 to 8.  Thus, the distribution of  d  is
L
t 
defined by the partition of the state space.  The agents discover this partition in the empirical By studying the relationship between prices and d agents discover the partition in the long run data.
5
t
This happens to be the truth at all dates but an agent may not believe it.  Instead he may form a rational belief
about this variable. This issue has little significance to our study and we chose the simpler assumption.
22
distribution and for simplicity we have assumed that agents believe this partition to be the truth. 
5
(2.2b)  The Rationality of Belief Conditions.  A stable process is a process which has, with
probability 1, a non-trivial empirical distribution on all finite dimensional sets.  The stationary
measure of the process is the unique extension of the empirical frequencies of  finite dimensional
sets to a probability on the entire space.  A Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) is a stable
equilibrium in which agents hold rational beliefs.  Hence, to establish an RBE we need to
construct an equilibrium process which is stable from which agents compute the empirical
distribution that is used to construct the stationary measure.  The rationality conditions require the
beliefs of the individual agents to imply a stationary measure which is equal to the one computed
from the data.  In the case of our model here, these concepts are significantly simplified.  We now
explain why.
The beliefs Q  and Q   of the two agents are probabilities on the space of sequences 
1 2
{( p ,q , d , y  ), t = 1, 2, ...}.  However, the probability used in (6c)-(6d) is Q ((& )| y ), the tt t t
k kk
probability which is conditional on the assessment variable of agent k.  The rationality of belief
conditions must then apply to this last conditional probability.  These conditions require that
(i)  Q ((& )| y ) is a stable measure and the dynamics of the economy under it has an
kk
empirical distribution with probability 1;
(ii) that the stationary measure of Q ((& )| y ) equals the probability on infinite sequences
kk







Since Q ((& )| y )  is represented by two Markov matrices used by the agent at different times,  we
kk
need to specify the joint distribution of (p ,q , y )  and the implied rationality conditions which tt t
k
are consistent with these Markov matrices.  To do that we use the "Conditional Stability
Theorem" (see Kurz and Schneider [1996] page 492 - 494).  It says that if the probability Q  of
k
the joint process  {(p ,q , y  ), t = 1, 2, ...} is stable, then Q ((& )| y )  which is the probability  Q   tt t
kk k k
conditional on the index y ,  is a stable probability on  {(p , q), t = 1, 2, ...} and the stationary tt t
k
measure of Q ((& )| y ) is the marginal of  Q   on (p ,q) obtained by integrating on y .
kk k k
tt
To simplify the procedure above we assume that the marginal distribution of  Q   on y   is
kk
t
i.i.d. and we denote these unconditional probabilities by  Q {y  = 1} = ￿   for k = 1, 2.  By the
kk
tk
Conditional Stability Theorem there exist two pairs of matrices, (F , F )  for agent 1 and (G , G ) 12 1 2
for agent 2, such that  Q   and  Q   are characterized by the following conditions:
12
(13a)   Q  for agent 1: adopt   F     if    y  = 1     Q   for agent 2: adopt  G    if    y  = 1
1 1 2 2
1t 1 t
            adopt   F     if    y  = 0        adopt  G    if    y  = 0. 2t 2 t
12
(13b)     .
An intuitive interpretation starts by noting that these rational agents believe that the price-
dividend process is not stationary,  and their beliefs are parametrized by  .   (13b) insists
that the sequence of matrices which they adopt is compatible with the true price-dividend process
( i.e. generating the same empirical distribution) which is a Markov process with transition matrix 
￿.   ￿   is the frequency at which agent 1 uses matrix F   and  ￿   is the frequency at which agent 2 11 2
uses matrix  G .  This leads to a formal definition of the equilibrium which we construct below: 1






























 In some presentations of this paper we were asked if our RBE can be viewed as a sunspot
6
equilibrium.  We note first that assessment variables are not observbles, the joint distribution of    is
not known and the agents do not have the structural knowledge needed to invert an equilibrium map.  Hence
an RBE cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium.  But the issue is deeper.  Even if we assumed, for the sake of
discussion, that   is observable and that the agents know the equilibrium map, the RBE is not a
sunspot equilibrium because the "sunspot" variable  alters the real economy.  That is, for the RBE
to be a sunspot equilibrium the different values of   must be associated with exactly the same
fundamentals of the economy.  This is not the case in an RBE.  For example, in the "sunspot" state (1, 1) the
von-Neumann Morgenstern preferences of the agents are defined by the probabilities (F  , G  ) while in the 11
"sunspot" state (0, 1) they are defined by (F  , G ).  These changes in the fundamentals  f the economy show 21
that endogenous uncertainty has real effects on the economy induced by the states of belief   .  We
also note that  given each state of belief   the equilibrium at date  t  is unique.
24
in which the (Q  , Q ) are defined by (13a) and satisfy the rationality conditions (13b) .
12 6
(2.2c) The Stationary Measure. We now assemble the conditions which  ￿ must satisfy.  Recall
that the probability of  d   is equal to the probability of the first four prices and the probability of 
H
d   is equal to the probability of the last four prices.  Now, (5) specfied the dividend process and
L
since in an RBE the driving mechanism of prices is the distribution of (d , y , y ), t = 1, 2,...,  it ttt
12  
follows that the marginal of  ￿ with respect to  d (or equivalently with respect to a random t
variable taking the value  1 when one of the first four prices occurs and 0 when one of the last
four prices is realized) must equal the dividend matrix in (5).  Similarly with respect to (y  , y ) : tt
12
the marginal of   ￿  with respect to each of the y   must be i.i.d. with probability  ￿ . tk
k
We observe that each agent has a marginal distribution on his own assessment variable,
hence the i.i.d. requirement on the marginals of  ￿ with respect to each one of the two
assessments is a consistency condition between the market observations and what each agent
perceives.  No such conditions apply to the joint distribution of the assessments.  This joint effect
of the assessment variables, as distinct from the individually perceived effect, is that part of   ￿ 
which describes the externalities of beliefs in the market performance.  These externalities cannot￿ ￿
1A, (1￿ 1)A
(1 ￿ 1)B, 1B
A ￿
a1, ￿1 ￿a1, ￿2 ￿a1,1 ￿a1 ￿￿1 ￿￿2
a2, ￿1 ￿a2, ￿2 ￿a2,1 ￿a2 ￿￿1 ￿￿2
a3, ￿1 ￿a3, ￿2 ￿a3,1 ￿a3 ￿￿1 ￿￿2
a4, ￿1 ￿a4, ￿2 ￿a4,1 ￿a4 ￿￿1 ￿￿2
,B￿
b1, ￿1 ￿b1, ￿2 ￿b1,1 ￿b1 ￿￿1 ￿￿2
b2, ￿1 ￿b2, ￿2 ￿b2,1 ￿b2 ￿￿1 ￿￿2
b3, ￿1 ￿b3, ￿2 ￿b3,1 ￿b3 ￿￿1 ￿￿2
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be found in each of the marginal distributions of the beliefs  Q .   They are, however, reflected in
k
the equilibrium process.  They specify that interactions among the agents which reflect the
structure of communication in society, the manner in which agents influence each other and how
the real variables in the economy (i.e. the dividends) affect this interaction.
In sum, the matrix  ￿  must satisfy the following:
(14a) the marginal on  y    is  i.i.d. with P{y  = 1} = ￿      for  k = 1, 2; tt k
kk
(14b) the marginal on  d   is Markov as specified by the dividend process (5); t
The family of matrices which satisfy these conditions is rather limited and the main
criterion for selecting from this family is flexibility in parameterization of equilibria. The following
matrix ￿ satisfies all the conditions specified in (14a) - (14b):
(15)
where  A  and  B  are  4×4 matrices which are characterized by the  10  parameters ￿ , ￿ , and   12
( a, b)  where  a = (a , a , a , a ),  b = (b , b , b , b ): 1234 1234
(16)  
If A g B then the distribution of   depends upon d . (16) implies that  t
for k = 1, 2 as required in (14a).  Note, however, that although each process 
for  k = 1, 2  is very simple, the joint process {(d , y  , y ), t = 1, 2,...} may be complex:  it allows tt t
12
correlation among the three central variables and these effects are important.  If we set ￿  = ￿  =.5 12
and a = b = .25 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 then all correlations are eliminated.  In this case the stationary ii￿ µ
Aj ￿ (aj, ￿1 ￿ aj, ￿2 ￿ aj,1￿ aj ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿2))
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distribution  (% , % , ... ,% )  implied  in (16) is  % = .125  for all i.  If, in addition, the agents 1 2 8 i
adopt the stationary measure as their belief (i.e. F  = G  =  ￿), then we have exactly an REE. 11
For simplicity of parameterization, we set in almost all simulations the parameter values 
￿  = ￿  = .57 ,  a = (a  g a  = a  = a  )  and  b = (b  g b  = b  = b ).  It is clear, however, that there 12 1234 1234
are natural restrictions which the parameters must satisfy and these will be discussed later.  We
specify now the family of rational beliefs which we use in the simulations.
(2.2d) Rational Beliefs: the Family of Optimism/Pessimism Beliefs.  We now use two parameters
 and    to select two pairs of matrices: (F , F ) of agent 1 and (G , G ) of agent 2 satisfying the 12 1 2
rationality conditions (13b).  To do that denote the row vectors of  A  and  B by:
  j = 1, 2, 3, 4
j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
With this notation we define the 4 matrix functions of a real number  z  as follows:
(17)      ,   .
Finally we define
(18) .
By the rationality conditions (13b),  .
To motivate this construction, note that the parameters  ￿  and  µ  are proportional
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and µ > 1 imply increased probabilities of states (1, 2, 3, 4) in matrix F  of agent 1 and matrix G 11
of agent 2 where the first four prices are associated with the states when  d = d .  Since these are t
H
the states of the higher prices,  ￿ > 1  implies that agent 1 is optimistic about high prices at  t + 1. 
Similarly for µ > 1.  In all simulations below we set  ￿ ￿ 1 and  µ ￿ 1  and hence the assessment
variables  y  have a simple interpretation: when  y  = 1 agent  k  is optimistic (relative to ￿ )  at  tt
k   k
t  about high prices at t + 1.  The special case of  ￿ = 1 ,   µ = 1 and  a = b = .25  identifies an ii
REE.  Finally, it turns out that the concepts of "agreement" and "disagreement" between the
agents are useful.   We then say that the agents agree if   y  =  y   and disagree if  y  g  y . tt tt
12 12
(2.2e)  Markov Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE). Conditions (6c) - (6d) require each agent to
forecast prices (p  , q ).  A rational agent should be able to perform this task since there is a t + 1 t + 1
set of  8  prices {(p  , q )} that can occur at date  t + 1  and all agents know this set from past t + 1 t + 1
history.  We can then use the index set  S  with the map (12) to define equilibrium consumptions,
portfolios and prices in terms of the transitions from state  s  to state  j  in the set S.  To state the
equilibrium conditions in these terms denote by   agent  k’s probability of price state 
j  given price state  s  and the value of   which he perceives at state s  but under the competitive
assumption that  k  knows neither the map (12) nor the fact that he influences prices.  Conditions













s ￿ 0f o r a l l s .
(a1,a 2,a 3,a 4)( b 1,b 2,b 3,b 4) ￿1, ￿2 and 1
ai ,b i ￿ ￿1 <1 f o r i￿ 1,2,3,4
ai ,b i ￿ ￿2 <1 f o r i￿ 1,2,3,4














￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ 1
1￿1
µ ￿








￿ ￿ ￿s ￿ µ ￿ µs for all s ￿ 1,2,...,8
￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2






A stable Markov RBE is then a solution of equations (19a)-(19f) for feasible parameters.  
We now review the feasibility conditions which the model parameters are required to
satisfy.  The parameters   ,  ,   must satisfy
(20)
.
The selection of   (￿ , µ) is restricted by  10  inequality constraints:
(21)
            
The RBE’s in our simulations are solutions of the 48 equations (19a) - (19f) in prices and
quantities which satisfy the feasibility constraints (20) - (21).   The particular family of RBE which
we shall study in the simulations is drastically simplified by the following criteria:
(i)    a single intensity variable    ;
(ii)    ;
(iv)    for two parameters (c  , c  ); 12
(iii)    in the realistic interval [ 2.5 , 3.5] (see results of Kurz and 
Beltratti [1997]) ;   are in the empirically plausible interval [.85 , .95].￿1 , ￿2 ￿1 and ￿2






It follows from these specifications that once we select empirically realistic  ,  ,
the model is entirely determined by the four parameters :  ￿, ￿ , c  , c  . 12
We comment on the difference between our treatment and Kurz and Beltratti [1997].  The
earlier paper introduced the vectors   and    and allowed
the agents to select 16 parameters.  This permits the agents to select parameters    which
vary with prices.  Since there are only two agents in the model they obviously have an effect on
prices but are required to act competitively and ignore such effect.  By allowing the agents to
select different    for different s, we permit the agents to take into account their effect on
prices and thus violate the condition of anonymity (see Kurz [1998] for more details).  Our
procedure of selecting only two parameters    ensures anonymity.
 3.  Endogenous Uncertainty and Volatility: Simulation Results
 We now examine the model’s success in simulating the real economy.  For this reason we
first review the empirical averages in the U.S. of the key seven variables of the model:
p   -  the long term price/dividend ratio.  Mehra and Prescott [1985]( in short M&P [1985]) used
the data base compiled by Shiller [1981] for 1889-1978.  We used the updated version of
the same Shiller’s data base for 1889 - 1998 and estimated this variable to be  22.84; 
 -  the standard deviation of the price/dividend ratio p.  For the period 1889 - 1998 we
estimated it to be  6.48 using the updated version of Shiller’s [1981] data base;
R    -  the average risky return on equities was estimated by M&P [1985] to be  6.98%.  Using the
updated Shiller [1981] data for 1989 - 1998 our estimate is 8.34% suggesting that 6.98%






 -  the standard deviation of R was estimated by M&P [1985] to be 16.67%.  Using the
updated data for 1989 - 1998 our estimate is 18.08%;  
r  -  The mean riskless interest rate was estimated by M&P [1985] to be .80% for 1889 - 1978.  It
F
is based on the 90 day treasury bill rate for 1931 - 1978.  However, for 1889 - 1931 one
may estimate the riskless rate by using various alternative securities.  We do not offer an
independent estimate and suggest that the evidence places the mean riskless rate around 
1.00%.  There is some evidence that this low rate has prevailed mostly since the Great
Depression and that prior to 1931 the rate was higher (see Siegel [1994]);
 -  the standard deviation of  r  was estimated by M&P [1985] to have an average of 5.67% 
F
during the period of 1889 - 1978;
’   -  the premium of equity return over the riskless rate.  Given that we set the estimate of the
mean riskless rate around  1.00%, and given the evidence regarding the mean risky rate
which we record as  8.00%,  we conclude that the empirical evidence places the mean
equity premium around  7.00%;
3.1  The Scaling Problem of OLG Models
Before proceeding we resolve the issue of scaling an RBE.  The problem arises from the
fact that in our OLG economy agents live for two periods and the young purchase from the old
the capital stock of the economy using their labor endowment.  Hence, the equilibrium   in
the model depends entirely on the endowment of labor income of the young.  Since in the real
economy it takes a generation for the capital stock to change ownership from the old to the
young, our OLG model faces a problem. If the labor income of the young is of the same order of7 ￿ 71 ￿ 72
7 ￿ 71 ￿ 72
7 ￿ 12 7 ￿ 14 7 ￿ 18 7 ￿ 22 7 ￿ 23 7 ￿ 24 7 ￿ 25 7 ￿ 26
￿ ￿ µ ￿ 1; ￿1￿￿2￿.5 ￿1￿￿2￿3.25 ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ .90
31
magnitude as dividend income in the economy, the model will never be able go generate a
price\dividend ratio of 23.  Hence, the young’s labor endowment must be a large multiple of  D  t
in any one year in order to attain an equilibrium price\dividend ratio close to the historical
average of about  23.  To highlight the point, Table 1 below presents the equilibrium values of (p,
r  , R , ’) in a sequence of REEs in which   take different values. Other parameter 
F
Table 1:  REE Solutions for Varying Values of    
p 11.39 13.35 17.26 21.17 22.15 23.13 24.11 25.09
r 10.24%   8.93%   7.21%   6.13%   5.92%   5.72%   5.54%   5.38% F 
R 10.75%   9.44%   7.71%   6.62%   6.41%   6.21%   6.04%   5.87%
’     .51%     .51%     .50%     .49%     .49%     .49%     .49%     .49%
choices in Table 1 are: a = b = .25 for all i;    ;  ;   .  ii
Table 1 shows that variations in the endowment of the young acts as a scaling factor which
determines the level of prices (p, q) and hence the average returns on securities.  Note that when   
7  reaches the range of 24,  p  is close to 23 and the mean risky return is 6.21%.  Both means are
close to the historical average.
Our procedure is then to select that value of the endowment which results in a
price\dividend ratio of approximately  p = 23.  For the RBE below, this value is  7 = 26.  We
view this as a pure scaling of the OLG model and in this sense the model does not reproduce the
empirical evidence of  p = 23, it is scaled to that level.
The problem of scaling the OLG model raises a deeper question, which may have already
occurred to the reader: why should we expect the unrealistic OLG model to be an appropriate
model for the study of market volatility?  Since the discount rate is around  10%, the unit of time32
is a year and hence the model length of life of an agent is not an approximation of real human
work life.  Our answer to this question consists of two parts.  First, note the fact that once the
model was scaled, the predictions of the REE of the model reproduced very closely the
predictions of the M& P [1985] model of infinitely lived agents.  This analytical fact is the main
reason why we have postponed the discussion of the question at hand until this point.
Turning to the second answer we note first that the Euler equations of an OLG agent are
exactly the same as the Euler equations of an infinitely lived agent.  The crucial differences
between them are the definitions of their budget constraint, their consumption and wealth.  Since
our model assumptions imply that aggregate consumption is proportional to total dividends, it
follows that the growth rates of dividends and aggregateconsumption are identically the same in
the OLG model and in the M& P [1985] infinite horizon  model, and obey the exogenous Markov
process defined by (5).  Given this fact we need to assess why might one expect the models to
have different predictions.  If the equity premium and other "anomalies" in financial market are
determined by real factors such as the horizon of the agents’ optimization and by the life cycle
saving patterns over the very long horizon, then the OLG model and the infinite horizon models
would yield drastically different results.  Alternatively, if the characteristics of market volatility
under study are essentially driven by expectations, then, given the Markov structure of the model,
it would not make any difference whether the agents trade infinite number of times over their own
life-time or only once; their expectations for one date at a time will drive the results.  Hence, if
our theory is right and the phenomena under study are primarily expectation driven, then the OLG
model is an entirely useful model for the study of market volatility.71 ￿ 72 ￿ 24
￿ ￿ µ ￿ 1; ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ .5 ￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ 3.25





3.2  Results for REE: the Equity Premium Puzzle
Focusing on the case    we now study further the REE which is defined by
the parameter choices in Table 1:  a = b = .25 for all  i ;     ;  ii
and   .  The results in Table 2 represent the main components of what is known 
        Table 2:  REE Results
variable    REE Empirical 
Record
    p 23.13   23
   )     .069     6.48 p
   R   6.21%     8.00%
   )   4.12%   18.08% R
   r   5.72%     1.00% F
       .88%     5.67%
   ’     .49%     7.00%
as "the equity premium puzzle."  In the narrow sense, the puzzle is the observation that the model
prediction of  ’  is  .49%  while the historical average is 7.00%.  Note that the REE predicts
reasonably well the mean rate of return on equities but errs in predicting a riskless rate of 5.72%
when the empirical average is 1.00%.  Hence, the puzzle of the low equity premium is the puzzle
of the very high riskless rate predicted by the REE of the model.  M& P [1985] noted this fact.
An inspection of Table 2 reveals that the equity premium is not the only problem which
the REE of the model presents;  all volatility measures in the table are low relative to the
historical record.  The empirical value of    is 94 times larger than the REE prediction, the
value of    is more than 4 times larger than the REE prediction and the value of     is over 6
times larger than the model prediction.  One objective of Kurz [1994] and of the papers in Kurz
[1997] was to demonstrate that the theory of RBE points to Endogenous Uncertainty as the
explanation of this high volatility.  Endogenous Uncertainty is that component of economic risk71 ￿ 72 ￿ 26
￿ ￿ µ ￿ 1.7542
￿1 ￿ ￿2￿ .57



















which is propagated within the market by the beliefs of the agents.  This is our next subject. 
3.3  A Family of RBE with Optimists/Pessimists 
We study a family of "optimists\pessimists" RBE.  For this family we scale the model by
selecting    and the four parameters which characterize this family are as follows:
(i)   .  This is a model where an agent is optimistic when his assessment variable
takes the value 1; in that state he adjusts the probabilities of high prices in the next period by a
factor of 1.7542 which is approximately the maximal feasible value.
(ii)    hence in the majority of dates (57%) an agent is optimistic while only in 43%
of the time he is pessimistic.  In a large economy this assumption means that the optimists are
always in the majority but we shall see later that this also means that the pessimists are more
intense in their outlook than the optimists;
(iii) Correlation of belief parameters: a = b with  a  = b  = c  =.50 and      for i = 111
2, 3, 4.  These parameters regulate the correlation of the states of beliefs of the agents.  The state
of belief is defined by a random variable L which takes three values: (i)   if    is t
the state OO when both agents are optimistic; (ii)    is the state PP when
both agents are pessimistic and  (iii)   is the state DIS when theagents disagree. 
The stochastic process { L , t = 1, 2, ...} is a  Markov process with the transition matrix: t
(OO) (PP) (DIS) t + 1 t + 1 t + 1
   .50   .36    .14
   .14     0    .86
(DIS)t    .14     0    .86ai ￿ bi ￿ c2 ￿ .14
a1 ￿ b1 ￿ c1 ￿ .50
￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2





The condition  for i = 2, 3, 4 means that if at  t  the state of belief is PP or DIS,
PP cannot occur at  t + 1: the agents are either optimistic or they disagree.   The condition
  implies that a state of total optimism at date t can be followed by any state at
date t+1.  Hence, the structure of correlation takes the following form:
(i)  unanimous optimism at t may leads to any state of belief at  t + 1; 
  (ii) unanimous pessimism or disagreement at   t  prevents total pessimism at  t + 1.
We shall see that the emergence of asymmetries in an otherwise symmetric economy is the key to
understanding the structure of endogenous volatility.  Observe that the transition matrix of the
states of belief is not symmetric.  To understand later results caused by this matrix we observe
that the very high bull market prices and the very low crash stock prices result from an interaction
between the growth rate of the economy determined by the states of d and the states of belief.  t
This implies that the asymmetry in the transition matrix of the states of belief will translate into
asymmetry in the dynamics of stock prices.  We shall explore the exact pattern later.
In Table 3 we report the simulation results for   from  2.5  to  3.5 and  
 from .85 to .95 hence these results apply to a reasonably wide range of values of  ￿ 
and  ￿.  Table 3 shows that under the given parameterization, the model predicts well the
historical record.  If we compare the results in Tables  3 with the empirical record, we note a
small difference only in two variables.  The mean risky return R is close to the historical average
of 8.00% and its standard deviation     is clearly close to 18.08%; the riskless rate is within
range of the historical average of 1.00%, and the equity premium is clearly close to the historical
record of 7.00%.  In the case of   the historical average is 6.48  while the model prediction is




Table 3: Results for RBE with optimists\pessimists
￿ = 2.5 ￿ = 2.75 ￿ = 3.00 ￿ = 3.25 ￿ = 3.50
￿ = .85     p   23.06   23.12   23.19  23.26  23.34
   )     2.53     2.78    3.00    3.20    3.36 p
   R     7.85%     8.19%    8.51%    8.80%   9.05%
   )   18.76%   20.63%  22.27%  23.69%  24.89% R
   r     2.36%     1.79%    1.22%      .66%      .12% F
     14.62%   16.12%  17.41%  18.48%  19.35%
   ’     5.49%      6.40%    7.29%    8.14%    8.93%
￿ = .90     p   23.36   23.38  23.43  23.48  23.54
   )     2.52     2.77    2.99    3.18    3.34       p
   R     7.75%     8.08%    8.39%    8.70%    8.93%   
   )   18.48%   20.32%  21.94%  23.35%  24.55% R
   r     2.37%     1.81%    1.25%      .71%      .18%    F
     14.40%   15.89%  17.17%  18.24%  19.11% 
   ’     5.38%     6.27%    7.14%    7.97%    8.75%
￿=.95     p   23.64   23.63  23.66  23.69  23.74
   )     2.51     2.76    2.97    3.16    3.28 p
   R     7.65%     7.98%    8.29%    8.57%    8.61%
   )   18.22%   20.03%  21.64%  23.03%  23.40%    R
   r     2.37%     1.83%    1.29%      .75%      .04%    F
     14.20%   15.67%  16.95%  18.02% 19.04%
   ’     5.28%     6.15%    7.00%    7.82%    8.57%
 around  14.2 - 19.4.  In both cases the predictions are not accurate but the order of magnitudes
of the model predictions and the historical record are close.
3.4  The Explanatory Neighborhood as a Method of Analysis
Why is the RBE able to explain the data?  Since our model offers a resolution of the equity
premium puzzle, what is the economic interpretations of the conditions which define the model
and what are the theoretical reasons that these conditions enable the model to explain the
historical record?  The methodology which we use to answer these questions is central to the









Part 1: Our model identifies a relatively small "explanatory neighborhood" in the parameter space
under which the RBE’s prediction matches the empirical record;
Part 2: The explanatory neighborhood which is defined by the values of (￿ , ￿ , ￿ , µ) has a 12
simple economic meaning: in these RBE optimists are in the majority but the intensity of
the pessimists is relatively stronger than the intensity of the optimists;
Part 3: There is no other neighborhood in the feasible parameter space that identifies RBE which
match the historical record.
We start by the examination of a small neighborhood in the parameter space.  In Table 4 
Table 4: Results for the Explanatory Neighborhood
= .56 = .57 = .58
= .56     p  23.56  23.59  23.97
   )    2.69    2.79    2.11 p
   R    7.95%    8.09%    7.19%
   )  19.86%  20.60%  15.84% R
   r    3.32%    1.56%    1.41% F
   17.09%  16.42%  12.12%
   ’    4.63%    6.53%    5.78%
= .57     p  23.59  23.48  23.90
   )    2.79    3.18    2.22 p
   R    8.09%    8.70%    7.31%
   )  20.60%  23.35%  16.52% R
   r    1.56%      .71%      .92% F
   16.42%  18.24%  12.70%
   ’    6.53%    7.97%    6.39%
= .58     p  23.97  23.90  23.87       
   )    2.11    2.22 1.94 p
   R    7.19%    7.31%    7.00%
   )  15.84%  16.52%  14.35% R
   r    1.41%      .92%    1.89% F
   12.12%  12.70%  10.96%
   ’    5.78%    6.39%    5.11%




￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ .57
 In reference to the discussion in Section 1 we note that some who oppose  the use of heterogenous beliefs
5
have argued that such models allow for too many equilibria and hence give a researcher too much freedom in explaining
any empirical phenomena.  The conclusion here shows that this is a superficial argument since the isolation of a small
neighborhood in the parameter space which is compatible with the historical record acts exactly as identification in any
econometric model.  In fact, we shall argue below that the existence of such a set of parameters arises directly from the
rationality conditions of the RBE and to that extent the method employed supports the RBE theory employed.
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.57 and .58.  It is clear from the restrictions on the parameter space in (20) - (21) that once we
change these parameters, we must also change other parameters in accord with the feasibility
conditions.  For example, if     is changed from .57 to .58, the maximal value of  ￿ which is
feasible changes to 1.7241, the value of    to .15 but the value of    remains equal to .50.  In all
cases ￿ = .90 and  ￿ = 3.25.  In  examining the results in Table 4 note that within this narrow
neighborhood there are model configurations which predict     in the range of  11.0 - 12.7
which is only twice the historical average. We observe that the explanatory neighborhood is
relatively a very small set in the parameter space.  
Moving on to the Part 3 of our methodology we assert that  there is no other
neighborhood in the parameter space yielding predictions which are close to the empirical
record.  Given that the dividend process and the parameter values of   for k = 1, 2  have
been fixed at the specified realistic values, the small size of the  neighborhood of the other four
parameter is a striking fact!  It implies that our RBE has a unique theoretical explanation of the
historical record  which we now explore.
5
We thus turn to Part 2: the economic interpretation of the family of models which is
defined by four parameters: ￿, ￿, c  and c .  We recall first that    means that both 12
agents are optimistic in 57% of the dates. 
The second parameter is ￿ = 1.7542 which is approximately the maximal value of the((p1,q1),(p2,q2),(p3,q3),(p4,q4))







￿F1 ￿ (1￿￿)F2 ￿ ￿
((p1,q1),(p2,q2),(p3,q3),(p4,q4))




















adjustment, by an optimist, of the probability of   next period. 
To see the implication of this choice recall the transition matrix (5) for the growth rate of
dividends and the feasibility conditions (21).  In the neighborhood of   , we have ￿ =
1-1 =.57 and the binding feasibility constraints are    ,  . Suppose that   
agent 1 is an optimist using F .  As  ￿  in  F  rises, the rationality conditions  11  
require a downward adjustment of the probability of   in the
pessimistic matrix  F .  Although the changes of the probabilities in  F  are made to correspond to 22
the change of probabilities in F , the rationality conditions, which regulate the relation between 1
them, induce a fundamental asymmetry between the intensities of the two.
To explain the asymmetry in intensities, note that the matrix in (5) implies that the upper
limit of the feasible ￿  is almost reached at 1.7542 when some probabilities in the matrix  F   are 2
close to 0.  Symmetry appears to dictate an exact correspondence between the 0  entries in the
matrix F  and the entries of  1  in F .  At  ( , ￿ = 1.7542)  this symmetry does not 21
hold.  If    is the (ij) entry of  F ,  then      for j = 1, 2, 3, 4  and if    is the (ij) entry of  1
F ,  then   .  In the neighborhood of    and ￿ = 1.7542 we 2
have the following asymmetric conclusion:
(22a) For all    i = 1, 2, ..., 8,               for  j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
(22b) For only i = 5, 6, 7, 8,                for  j = 5, 6, 7, 8.
(22a) says that in the neighborhood  pessimistic agents are almost certain that a recession will
occur at date  t + 1.  This extreme degree of pessimism holds for all states of the economy at date
t.  Now, (22b) says that optimistic agents at date t are almost certain that a recession will not












expansion mode at  t,  the optimistic agent thinks that the probability of a recession at t + 1 is
about  25%.  We thus propose to view the pessimists in this configuration as being more intensely
pessimistic than the optimists and because of this difference in intensity, they have a greater effect
on the security markets.  We stress that the asymmetry discussed here is the result of the
rationality of belief conditions and hence it is an essential characteristic of an RBE.
We finally turn to the economic interpretation of the parameters a = b = (.50 , .14, .14,
.14). These regulate the correlation between the assessment variables  defined by the
transition matrix of the states of belief.  The central impact of this matrix is on the dynamics of
prices: the correlation of    implies that bull and bear markets are asymmetric.  For the
market to transit from the lowest price of the crash states (in the recession d = d and the state of
L 
belief in DIS) to the highest prices of the bull market states (which occur in PP)  it needs to take
several steps since it cannot go directly from the low to the high prices.  The opposite, however,
is possible since at the bull market states there is a positive probability of reaching the crash
states in one step.  Thus a bull markets which reaches the highest price must evolve in several
steps but a crash can occur in one step. 
To sum up this section, we offer a simple and intuitive reason why the RBE generates a
low riskless rate and a high equity premium.  Relative to ￿ there are, at any time, optimists and
pessimists in the population of investors but on average there are more optimists than pessimists.
Since over the entire population the average belief must correspond to ￿,  the rationality of belief
conditions imply that the intensity level of the pessimists dominates and their high demand for the
riskless asset raises its price, leading to a low equilibrium riskless rate and high equity premium.










































￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ .90
￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ 3.25
41
Fig. 1b: RBE Simulation Fig. 1a: REE Simulation
3.5  The Dynamics of Asset Price and Return
We turn now to the examination of some of the dynamic characteristics of asset prices
under the RBE theory.  We discuss three characteristics: (i) the structure of asset price volatility,
(ii) the property of time dependent variance of  asset returns (i.e. the GARCH property) and (iii)
the forward discount bias in foreign exchange markets.
(i) The Structure of Asset Price volatility. We have noted that little attention has been paid in
recent literature to the question of price volatility and the problem of ensuring that price volatility
in the model has the same structure as the volatility realized in the market.  In Figures 1a, 1b we
present time series of model simulation.  Each contains   200 realized price\dividend ratios (which
we call "the" price) generated by the REE of Table 2 and the RBE of  Table 3 with    
and   .  The standard deviation of the price\dividend ratio is .069 in the REE and
3.18 in the RBE.  There are two distinct prices in the REE: 23.20 and 23.06 with a mean of
23.13.  In the RBE there are 6 distinct prices with a conditional mean of  25.82 given d , a mean
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Fig. 2: RBE Simulation
of 21.14 given d  and with an unconditional mean of 23.48.  It is natural to decompose the
L
standard deviation of prices in the RBE into two components.  The first component, which is an
amplification of the effect of dividends on prices, is measured by the standard deviation of a
random variable which takes the values of  25.82  when d = d  and 21.14  when d = d .  Hence, tt
H L
keeping the REE functional relation between prices and exogenous variables, amplification
increases the impact of exogenous variables on prices.
The second component of volatility is the pure effect which the states of belief have on
price volatility.  This component is uncorrelated with the exogenous dividend  process and
represents pure Endogenous Uncertainty which takes the form of additional prices induced by the
states of beliefs and by the variability of the states of beliefs over time. To define this effect let 
 when   and  0  otherwise, and let    when   and 0 otherwise.  Now
define  .  In
Figure 2 we exhibit 200 values of et
computed from the simulated values of the
RBE in Figure 1b. What is interesting
about Figure 2 is the asymmetry in the
distribution of  e  which is generated by the t
basic asymmetry in the causal structure of
volatility in this model.  We conclude by
noting that if we take the volatility of the
price\dividend ratio in the REE to be approximately the volatility that can be justified by the


























































Fig. 3: RBE Simulation
beliefs of the agents either in the form of price amplification or in the form of pure endogenous
volatility.  Thus, most of the volatility of asset prices is endogenously generated.
(ii) The GARCH Property of Asset Returns.  In Figure 3 we exhibit the   - the square of the
risky returns - associated with the prices generated by the RBE of Figure 1b.  Note that the bursts
of price volatility in Figure 1b reappear as a GARCH property of asset returns; that is, Figure 3
shows that the variance of the risky rates of
return changes over time. Since the growth
of dividends is a stationary Markov process,
the time variability of the risky return is the
result of the dynamical properties of the
states of belief in the market.
What is the cause for the GARCH
property of the risky return? To answer this
question recall the transition matrix of the
state of beliefs which we reproduce here. We observe first that a regime of "agreement" (when
in states OO or PP) generates price variability which is sharply different from the price
(OO) (PP) (DIS) t + 1 t + 1 t + 1
   .50   .36    .14
   .14     0    .86
(DIS)t    .14     0    .86
variability in the regime of disagreement (when  in state DIS).  Now suppose that at some









of beliefs. If it moves to  PP  it remains in the regime of agreement and if from PP it moves back
to OO it completes a cycle within the regime of agreement.  If, however, the economy moves
from PP to DIS, a regime of disagreement is started with sharply different price volatility
characteristics.  Note the sharp spikes in Figure 2.  The very highest price occurs only in the
regime of agreement when the state of belief is in PP while the lowest "crash" price occurs in the
recession when d = d  and beliefs are in DIS.  As the states of beliefs change over time, market t
L 
prices and returns move among different volatility regimes.  Indeed, the volatility regimes of
returns  is a Markov process with varying degrees of persistence because the states of belief is a
Markov process with varying degrees of persistence.  We conclude that the GARCH property of
asset return is caused by the dynamic properties of the different regimes of belief.
  To further examine the GARCH property of asset returns we simulated 100,000
observations of    in the RBE.  Estimating the regression   , we report in
Table 5 the first 10 terms of the autocorrelation function of the residual of   .  Note that the
first three terms are large and the majority of terms are positive but decline rapidly, a result which
   Table 5: The Autocorrelation Function of the Residuals of the Squared Return Regression
l a g      1      2     3     4      5 6 7891 0
 .026  .044  .016  .007  -.003  -.005  .0007  .0003  .001  .004
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)  (.003)  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
is compatible with the evidence (see Brock and LeBaron [1996]).   We have explored several
models that may best describe the behavior of the data over time.  Following the Akaike
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where
.
      
(iii)  The Forward Discount Bias in Foreign Exchange Markets.  Kurz [1997a] and Black [1997]
developed a model which is similar to ours except for the addition of a second country and two
more short term nominal debt instruments.  To define the problem that was addressed in these
papers suppose that you estimate a regression of the form
(23)
where   is the change of the exchange rate between date t and date t + 1 while
 is the difference between the short term nominal interest rates in the domestic and the
foreign economies.  Under rational expectations the differential of the interest rates at date  t 
should provide an unbiased predictor of the depreciation of the currency between date t and date 
t + 1.  This means that apart from a technical correction for risk aversion the parameter ￿  should
be close to 1.  In 75 empirical studies in which equation (23) was estimated, the estimates of the
parameter  ￿  are significantly less than 1.  Indeed, in many studies this parameter was estimated
to be negative (see Froot [1990], Engel [1996] for an extensive survey).  The failure of this
parameter to exhibit estimated values close to 1 is known as the "Forward Discount Bias" in
foreign exchange markets.  Applying the RBE theory to this market, Kurz [1997a] and Black
[1997] estimated  ￿   to be .152.  However, the specifications in their models were different from
ours and violated the condition of anonymity which we have imposed on our model.  We have(7￿H , 7￿L) 7￿ ￿ 7￿H
7￿H ￿ 24.6
7￿L ￿ 23.4 7￿H ￿ 26.6 and 7￿L ￿ 25.4
￿￿ ￿
.81A. 8 ( 1 ￿1)A .21A .2(1￿1)A
.8(1￿1)B .81B. 2 ( 1 ￿1)B .21B
.81C. 8 ( 1 ￿1)C ,21C. 2 ( 1 ￿1)C
.8(1￿1)D .81D. 2 ( 1 ￿1)D .21D
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thus reformulated the model so as to satisfy our narrow parameter specification.  There are,
however, several issues that need to be evaluated first.
If we think of the first agent as the "domestic U.S." and the second agent as a "foreign
economy" then we need to reformulate the model so as to allow the introduction of two nominal
interest rates, two different monetary policies and a different stochastic structure.  We thus
assume that there is only one stock market in the home currency and the stochastic process of
dividends is as in (5).  As in our model above we also assume that the endowment\dividend ratio
of the domestic agent is a constant  7  and the domestic economy has a real bill which is traded by
both agents.  But then, how should we model the second country?  What is the meaning of an
exogenous shock in the foreign country?  With such difficulties we (along with Kurz [1997a] and
Black [1997]) model a hypothetical foreign economy which is characterized as follows:
(i) the endowment\dividend ratio 7* of the foreign agent is a random variable with two states 
 which is i.i.d with the probability of     being .8;
(ii) the shocks to endowment are small, say of  2% - 3% hence in the REE    and
  and in the RBE   .  Monetary policy in the home
economy is responsive to the dividend shocks and monetary policy in the foreign country is
responsive to the endowment shock in the foreign economy.  The main reason for the endowment
shock in the foreign economy is to allow the determination of the exchange rate in any REE;
(iii)  an RBE requires a selection of a  ￿*  matrix to generate the stationary measure of the
equilibrium dynamics.  A matrix that satisfies the requirements specified is






￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ .90 , ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ 3.25
￿s ￿ ￿ ￿ µ ￿ µs ￿ 1.7542
7￿H ￿ 24.6 7￿L ￿ 23.4 7￿H ￿ 26.6 7￿L ￿ 25.4
)ex
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where A, B, C, and D are matrices of the form (16).  The crucial ingredient of the Explanatory
Neighborhood is the assumption ￿  = ￿  = .57 and   and we shall 12
continue to maintain this assumption.
(iv) in our basic domestic model we set  A = B and  a = b = (.50, .14, .14, .14) which we shall
continue to assume.  Given that the probability of     is  .8,   it follows from the structure
of the matrix  ￿* that 80% of the time, the international economy will look very much like our
domestic economy when the second agent has endowment of   .  But now, how should we
select C and D? What about the other 20% of the time when the lower part of  ￿*  is realized? 
To consider this point note that the arbitrary stochastic structure introduced by the i.i.d process
of  { } introduces into  ￿* a new and arbitrary element which may have nothing to
do with the way the international economy actually works.  This change must have some effect
on the dynamics of the states of beliefs.  The effect that we found was entirely minimal and is
represented by the simple specification  c =  a = b = (.50, .14, .14, .14) but d = (.57, .14, .57, .14). 
Hence we can view the international model as a proper extension of our earlier model.
Summary of specification:  1 = .43,    ,  ￿  = ￿  = .57,  12
, a =  b = c = (.50, .14, .14, .14), d = (.57, .14, .57, .14).  In the REE 
(7 = 24,   , ) ; in the RBE ( 7 = 26,  ,  ).
Table 6 presents the simulation results for the REE and the RBE of the specified international
model.  In Table 6  ex  denotes the "exchange rate" and    is the standard deviation of the
exchange rate.  Note first that the results for the REE are essentially the same as the results in
Table 2 and the parameter  ￿  is computed to be .95,  as is expected.  From the point of view of




exchange rate in the RBE relative to the REE.  Since the foreign economy is hypothetical we do
not suggest any particular value for  ex  and  .  Turning finally to the RBE, we observe that the 
Table 6:  Results for the Reformulated
International Model 
variable    REE     RBE  Empirical 
 Record
    p   23.31    23.94    23
   )       .37     2 .70      6.48 p
   R     6.21%      7.80%      8.00%
   )     4.72%    19.34%    18.08% R
   r     5.64%      1.52%      1.00% F
       1.89%    16.37%      5.67%
   ’       .57%      6.28%      7.00%
  ex       .68        .67        ----
       1.29%      9.93%       ----
   ￿       .95       .47  diverse < 1
results here are essentially the same as in Tables 3 or 4 but the new result is the simulated
equilibrium value of   ￿ = .47  which is significantly less than 1.   We thus can conclude that the
Forward Discount Bias is one more anomaly which is explained by the same model.  We note
that sharper results for the parameter  ￿   could be obtained without any expected effect on the
other parameters by formulating the foreign sector in a more realistic way.
Why does the RBE predict a value for  ￿  which is much lower than 1?  Start by recalling
the REE argument in favor of  ￿  close to 1.  If  ￿ < 1  then in an REE agents can make an
expectational arbitrage: they can borrow in one currency and invest in the other, expecting that
the net return on their investment will be larger than the depreciation of the currency.  In a
stationary world in which all agents hold the same rational expectations the possibility of such a
riskless arbitrage cannot be an equilibrium.  Note that in world of securities (rather than an49
Arrow-Debreu world of contingent claims) this is not an arbitrage in the strict sense of the term
since the trades do not take place at the same time.
In an RBE agents hold diverse beliefs and borrow and invest based on their own beliefs. 
In such a world a differential nominal interest rates across countries offers an investment
opportunity but now such investment is subjected to endogenous uncertainty.  This results in a
true, equilibrium, process of the exchange rate which exhibits excessive fluctuations in part due to
variability in the states of belief of the agents.  Hence, at almost all dates the nominal interest
differential between the two countries is a biased estimate of the rate of depreciation of the
exchange rate one period later.  Why should we expect that under rational beliefs ￿ < 1?   To see
why, consider first an REE in which the difference between the domestic and foreign nominal
rates is z%.  In that equilibrium you do not need to form expectations on currency depreciation. 
It is sufficient for you to believe that other investors or currency arbitrageurs know the true
probability of currency depreciation and they have already induced the interest differential to be
equal to the average rate of currency depreciation which will be z%.  Now consider an RBE.  All
agents know that no one knows the true probability distribution of the exchange rate and
therefore the exchange rate is subject to endogenous uncertainty.  Being risk averse, agents who
invest in foreign currency would demand a risk premium on endogenous uncertainty and over the
long run the difference (1-￿)  is the premium received by currency speculators for being willing to
carry foreign currency positions.  For a positive premium it follows that ￿ < 1.
We close this discussion with a conjecture.  A phenomenon known as "smile curves"
appears in many markets for derivative assets.  An application of our theory to such markets faces
significant technical difficulties and for this reason we have not studied the effect of endogenous50
uncertainty on derivative markets.  However, given what we know about the phenomenon in
question we would conjecture that the present model would predict the emergence of smile curves
in derivative markets. 
4.  Conclusions
In this paper we advance the proposition that most of the observed volatility of asset
prices and returns is driven by the beliefs of agents and we thus question the basic proposition of
REE or the Efficient Markets theory that asset prices are determined only by fundamental values. 
The alternative theory of RBE predicts the emergence of Endogenous Uncertainty which is the
additional component of social risk and volatility which is propagated within the economy by the
beliefs and actions of agents.
By implication, the theory of RBE proposes that a large number of phenomena which are
viewed as REE "anomalies" in financial markets such as the equity premium puzzle, the GARCH
property of asset returns, the Forward Discount Bias in foreign exchange markets, the "smile
curves" in derivative pricing and many others, are all expectational phenomena in the sense that
they are entirely the consequences of the dynamics of the distribution of beliefs (i.e. the state of
beliefs) in our markets.  They have nothing to do with "fundamental" causes or exogenous
variables.  In support of this claim we present in this paper a single RBE model which is calibrated
to the long term U.S. statistics and with which we study some of these "anomalies". The model
predicts the empirically observed order of magnitude of: 
(i)   the long term mean and standard deviation of the price\dividend ratio; 
(ii)  the long term mean and standard deviation of the risky return on equities;51
(iii) the long term mean and standard deviation of the riskless rate;
(iv) the long term mean equity premium.
In addition, the model is able to predict
(v) the GARCH property of risky asset return;
(vi) the Forward Discount Bias in foreign exchange markets.
The common economic explanation for these phenomena is the heterogeneity of the beliefs
of agents.  Given such diversity, some agents are optimistic and some pessimistic.  In a simple
model which allows for these two states of belief there is a unique parameterization under which
the model makes all the above predictions simultaneously. This parameter choice requires the
optimists to be in the majority but the the RBE rationality conditions of requires the pessimists to
have a higher intensity level.  This intensity has a decisive effect which increases the demand for
riskless assets, decreases the equilibrium riskless rate and increases in the equity premium.
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